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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had a
very active docket in 2010 and handed down nineteen precedential
decisions related to international trade. These decisions included
important issues, such as: the implementation of a World Trade
Organization (WTO) decision affecting the controversial United
1
States practice of zeroing in antidumping cases; a reversal of the
United States Department of Commerce (DOC or Commerce)
method of calculating normal value for products sold by nonmarket
2
3
economies; the inclusion of disaster payments in net farm income;
and a finding that a party may not reverse its position on appeal

* Kevin J. Fandl, J.D., Ph.D., is Deputy Chief of Staff at U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and an Adjunct Professor of Law at American University
Washington College of Law where he teaches international trade law and trade and
development law. The author would like to thank the editors of this law review for
their outstanding commitment to making this article coherent and useful. The views
expressed in this article are of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those
of the U.S. government.
1. See ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States, 603 F.3d 928,
934–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the United States Department of Commerce’s
interpretation of an antidumping statute where Congress was found to have not
clearly spoken on the issue).
2. Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
3. Hacker v. United States, 613 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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4

without reasonable justification. Of the Federal Circuit’s nineteen
precedential cases about international trade, six reversed the United
5
States Court of International Trade (CIT).
By way of background, it is important to understand the context of
the Federal Circuit. The court was established in 1982 by merging
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
6
appellate division of the United States Court of Claims. The Federal
Circuit has jurisdiction over a number of matters, including
intellectual property, international trade, and government contracts,
7
among other issues. As an Article III court, judges are appointed by
8
the President, confirmed by the Senate, and serve for life. There are
9
twelve active judges on the court, including one chief judge. The
current Chief Judge, Randall R. Rader, assumed his position on June
10
11
1, 2010. Appeals are heard by a panel of at least three judges.
In the 2010 term, the vast majority of international trade cases
brought before the CAFC involved antidumping duties. Dumping is
the act of selling goods in an export market at less than what the
same goods are sold for in the exporter’s home market and is
12
regulated under the Tariff Act of 1930 (Tariff Act). In the United
States, the home market must be a market economy, meaning that
nonmarket economy sales are not generally calculated and surrogate
13
countries are used for comparison instead. Countries are generally
permitted to take actions to prevent harm to their domestic
manufacturers when harmed or threatened by allegedly-dumped
imports. Once a party files a petition with the DOC and the United
4. See Trs. in Bankr. of N. Am. Rubber Thread Co. v. United States, 593 F.3d
1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar a party
from maintaining an inconsistent position on appeal because it would, in part,
prejudice the opposing party).
5. See infra Parts I–III (discussing the Federal Circuit’s nineteen international
trade cases in 2010 and the disposition of each case).
6. Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act:
A Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 386 (1984).
7. Id. at 390.
8. Id. at 392.
9. Id.
10. Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/randall-r-rader-chief-judge.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2011).
11. See FED. CIR. R. 47.2 (“Cases and controversies will be heard and determined
by a panel consisting of an odd number of at least three judges, two of whom may be
senior judges of the court.”).
12. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(explaining dumping). See generally Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1304–1683g
(2006).
13. See Calculation of Normal Value of Merchandise from Nonmarket Economy
Countries, 19 C.F.R. § 351.408 (2009) (describing the special methodology for
nonmarket economies). This rule was invalidated by Dorbest Ltd. v. United States,
604 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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States International Trade Commission (ITC), an investigation is
opened and a final determination is made as to whether there is
14
dumping. An affirmative finding leads to the establishment of an
antidumping duty, meant to raise the price of the imported goods to
15
their fair market value.
United States Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) is required by law to collect the resulting dumping
16
duties from the importer.
Once an antidumping order is issued, it remains in effect for five
17
years pursuant to the WTO Antidumping Agreement. Interested
parties may challenge an antidumping order by claiming changed
circumstances—market or production conditions affecting the
calculation of the margin have changed—or by requesting
18
administrative review.
The order might also be changed or
terminated based upon the mandatory recalculation during the
sunset review, which is initiated every five years following the issuance
19
of the order, or based upon agreement between the parties, known
20
as suspension. Challenges are generally brought first to the DOC,
followed by appeals to the CIT, and then the Federal Circuit.
Four of the nineteen precedential international trade cases during
the Federal Circuit’s 2010 term addressed matters related to the
21
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). The
HTSUS is a comprehensive listing of all products and variations of
products traded in international commerce and includes descriptions
of those products along with negotiated duty rates for entry into the
22
U.S. market. The cases brought to the Federal Circuit in this area of
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)–(c) (2006).
15. Id. § 1673.
16. Id. § 1673e.
17. See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards:
contingencies, etc, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2011) (“Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of
imposition, unless an investigation shows that ending the measure would lead to
injury.”).
18. See § 1675(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he party seeking revocation of an [antidumping]
order or finding . . . shall have the burden of persuasion with respect to whether
there are changed circumstances sufficient to warrant such revocation . . . .”).
19. See id. § 1675(c)(1) (requiring the International Trade Administration (ITA)
and the ITC to examine any countervailing duty order five years after its issuance).
20. See generally id. §§ 1671c(b)–(c), 1673c(b)–(c) (allowing for the termination
or suspension of countervailing duties if certain parties, including foreign
governments, reach an agreement that completely eliminates the harmful effects of
exports on the United States).
21. See Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2010); Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. United States, 607 F.3d 771 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Outer Circle
Prods. v. United States, 590 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
22. See generally CUSTOMS LAW & ADMINISTRATION § 31.2 (Lawrence J. Bogard ed.,
3d ed. 2009) (providing an overview of the HTSUS).
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law involve challenges to the classification decisions of CBP, which is
the agency that is ultimately responsible for determining into which
23
category an imported good falls.
Other issues that were raised in the 2010 term included payments
by the United States Department of Agriculture for crop destruction
24
following a natural disaster; the application of the Harbor
25
Maintenance Tax to exports; and a procedural case involving the
question of whether judicial estoppel prevents a party from reversing
26
its position on appeal in a trade matter. All of these issues are
discussed in the following three sections: antidumping cases;
harmonized tariff schedule cases; and other trade law issues.
I.

ANTIDUMPING CASES
27

In Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition v. United States, the
Federal Circuit considered the appropriate standard of review that
should be applied to an appeal of a CIT decision to remand an ITC
28
finding for reconsideration.
In this antidumping case, Diamond
Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition (DSMC) petitioned the ITC for
the imposition of antidumping duties against imports of finished
diamond sawblades and diamond sawblade parts from China and
29
Korea. The ITC initiated an investigation of the subject imports
covering the period 2003 through 2005 and unanimously found that
although there had been a significant increase in subject imports that
undersold domestic like products and the domestic producers had
subsequently lost market share, the increase in imports did not
30
significantly affect domestic prices for the subject goods. The ITC
based its conclusion on the fact that foreign producers were largely
focused on different end-users (for example, retailers and consumers,
rather than construction companies and custom users) and that
foreign producers generally sold smaller, general-use blades, whereas
31
domestic producers sold large, custom-design blades. Accordingly,

23. See, e.g., Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 607 F.3d at 772–73 (challenging a CBP
classification of parts imported by Honda for use in its motorcycles and cars).
24. Hacker v. United States, 613 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
25. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 592 F.3d 1330, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
26. Trs. in Bankr. of N. Am. Rubber Thread Co. v. United States, 593 F.3d 1346,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
27. 612 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
28. Id. at 1356.
29. Id. at 1350–51.
30. Id. at 1351.
31. See id. (noting the ITC’s finding that the “‘large and growing volume of
subject imports was largely concentrated in size ranges and customer types other
than those served principally by the domestic industry’” (quoting Diamond
Sawblades and Parts Thereof from China and Kor., Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1092, 731-TA-
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the ITC concluded that the domestic industry was not materially
32
injured by the subject imports.
The majority of the ITC found that the increasing subject imports
33
did not threaten the domestic industry with material injury.
However, two of the six commissioners issued a dissenting opinion
alleging that “‘import trends, together with declining prices and the
weakening condition of the domestic industry, will result in material
injury by reason of subject imports unless antidumping orders are
34
issued.’”
They based their conclusions on the overlap between
many of the competing imports with domestic products and the
likelihood that the domestic industry would not be able to sustain its
35
efforts to remain competitive by lowering prices.
DSMC disputed ITC’s initial decision at the CIT, asserting that
36
ITC’s findings were not supported by “substantial evidence.” The
CIT concluded that the ITC’s findings with respect to sales volume,
price effects, domestic impact, threat analysis, and competition
37
required further examination. The CIT remanded the case to the
38
ITC for reconsideration. By the time the case was re-examined by
39
the ITC, two new commissioners had been appointed. The ITC
again concluded that the domestic industry suffered no material
40
injury from competing imports from Korea and China. However,
the new commissioners aligned with the former dissenters to yield a
41
tie vote on the issue of whether there was a threat of material injury.
42
A tie vote is considered an affirmative finding by the ITC. The two
foreign exporters appealed, and the CIT affirmed the ITC’s
43
decision.
The exporters challenged both CIT determinations before the
44
Federal Circuit. The most significant issue in this case was what

1093, USITC Pub. 3862, at 32 (July 5, 2006) (Final) [hereinafter Sawblades Final
Report])).
32. Id. at 1352.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Sawblades Final Report, supra note 31, at 43 (Aranoff & Hillman,
Comm’rs, dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1352–53.
38. Id. at 1353.
39. Id. On February 1, 2007, the Senate confirmed the nominations of Irving
Williamson and Dean Pinkert to the ITC. 153 CONG. REC. S1543 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
2007).
40. Diamond Sawblades, 612 F.3d at 1353.
41. Id. at 1354.
42. Id. (explaining that “a tie vote is deemed to be an affirmative determination
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11)”).
43. Id. at 1355.
44. Id.
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standard of review the Federal Circuit should apply to the CIT’s
order to the ITC that the Commission “provide a more thorough
45
explanation for [its] finding.” When the Federal Circuit reviews
factual determinations made by the CIT, it does so by re-examining
the case to determine whether the ITC’s determinations were
46
supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.
However, when the Federal Circuit reviews decisions by the CIT
ordering a remand to the ITC for further information, the court
47
applies an abuse of discretion standard. In Diamond Sawblades, all
parties agreed that the substantive review standard should be applied
to the second CIT decision; however, the parties disputed the proper
48
standard to be applied to the initial CIT decision.
The Federal Circuit evaluated the CIT’s decision to remand the
case to the ITC and concluded that it was based on a lack of sufficient
49
information from the ITC rather than a substantive finding.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the proper standard
50
of review to apply was the abuse of discretion standard. The Federal
Circuit concluded that “[i]t was not an abuse of discretion for the
[CIT] to require additional explanation from what it saw as a failure
to adequately explain its conclusion regarding price/volume
51
tradeoff.” Following its conclusion that the initial CIT decision was
not an abuse of discretion, the court went on to affirm the second
CIT decision, finding that substantial evidence supported the views of
52
the ITC.
Judge Dyk dissented from the majority opinion of Diamond
Sawblades, finding that the CIT’s initial decision to remand the case to
53
the ITC was made on substantive grounds. Judge Dyk argued that
the CIT repeatedly referred to issues of substantial evidence in its
opinion and that the CIT remanded the case based in part on the
ITC’s failure to provide substantial evidentiary support for its
54
findings. Accordingly, although Judge Dyk agreed with the CIT’s
decision to remand the case, he disagreed with the decision to

45. Id. at 1353, 1356.
46. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 287 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit must conduct its review of the CIT’s factual
findings by “stepping into the shoes” of that court).
47. Diamond Sawblades, 612 F.3d at 1356; Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d
1108, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48. 612 F.3d at 1356.
49. Id. at 1358, 1362.
50. Id. at 1358.
51. Id. at 1360.
52. Id. at 1362.
53. Id. at 1363 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
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require the Federal Circuit to apply the abuse of discretion standard
55
of review.
56
In Thai I-Mei Frozen Foods Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
57
reviewed the DOC’s interpretation of the antidumping statute. The
DOC investigated allegations that certain frozen shrimp exporters
from Thailand were selling their shrimp in the United States below
fair market value and, as a result, were hurting the domestic shrimp
58
industry. Since no actual sales data was available from the Thai
domestic market, the DOC calculated a constructed value to estimate
59
Thai I-Mei contended that Commerce
a dumping margin.
60
improperly calculated this margin.
To calculate this constructed value, the DOC relied on 19 U.S.C.
61
§ 1677b(e)(2)(B)(iii). This statute requires the DOC to determine
actual cost by adding the cost of: “(1) . . . materials and processing
used to produce the merchandise in the ordinary course of business,
(2) the actual selling, general, and administrative expenses and
actual profits realized in production of a foreign like product in the
62
ordinary course of trade, and (3) container costs.”
Where actual selling, profit, administrative and general expenses
are not available, the statute gives the agency three alternative means
for determining the actual cost of the product: 1) utilize “actual
amounts incurred by the specific exporter or producer for
merchandise in the same general category of the subject
merchandise;” 2) use “the weighted average of actual amounts
incurred by other exporters or producers subject to investigation for
the foreign like product;” or 3) determine “the amounts incurred
63
and realized ‘based on any other reasonable method.’”
In this case, the DOC chose the third alternative means of
64
determining a constructed value. The “reasonable method” it chose
involved calculating third country sales to Canada by the other two

55. Id. at 1363–65.
56. 616 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
57. Id. at 1301.
58. See id. at 1302 (detailing the DOC determination that shrimp from Thailand
were being dumped within the United States).
59. See id. (explaining that DOC constructed the value of Thai I-Mei’s dumping
margin by looking at profit information from other respondents’ third country
sales).
60. Id. Thai I-Mei proffered figures from other Thai companies operating in the
industry to show a lower profit margin, but Commerce rejected this submission. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1301.
63. Id. at 1301–02 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) (2006) (outlining
the procedure for determining the constructed value of imported articles)).
64. Id. at 1302.
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65

Neither party to
mandatory dumping investigation respondents.
this case objected to that decision. However, in making these
calculations, the DOC excluded data for sales not made in the
ordinary course of business, that is, below-cost sales and sales made
66
among affiliated parties.
The resulting dumping margin was
67
9.67%. Thai I-Mei submitted data from other Thai companies’ sales
to third country markets that showed a dumping margin between 0%
68
and 0.87%. Following the DOC’s rejection of its data, Thai I-Mei
69
challenged the DOC determination at the CIT.
The CIT concluded that the DOC’s methodology was supported by
substantial evidence; however, the court found that the agency had
failed to sufficiently justify why it excluded sales outside the ordinary
70
71
course of trade. The CIT remanded the decision to the DOC, and
the DOC responded, under protest, with a determination of a de
minimis dumping margin after including the sales outside the
72
73
ordinary course of trade. The DOC appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s remand
74
decision. The court reviewed the CIT decision de novo, concluding
75
that the DOC decision was “squarely within the territory of Chevron.”
Considering that § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act is a catch-all
provision allowing the DOC to apply any reasonable method to
determine constructed value, the role of the CIT is only to confirm
76
that the methodology applied by DOC was reasonable. The Federal
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Thai I-Mei Frozen Foods Co. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1372
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2008) (directing Commerce to calculate Thai I-Mei’s constructed
value under a method different than the one it previously used because the earlier
method was not “reasonable” as statutorily required).
72. Thai I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., 616 F.3d at 1304.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1309.
75. Id. at 1305 (noting Chevron’s applicability because the Tariff Act gives the
DOC explicit authority to use a “reasonable method” to calculate profit amounts).
Chevron requires courts reviewing an agency’s rulemaking to undertake a two-step
analysis. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984). The court must first determine whether Congress has directly spoken on the
question at hand. Id. If it has, that expression controls; however if it has not, then
the court must determine whether the agency’s decision “is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 842–43.
76. Thai I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., 616 F.3d at 1307 (determining that the DOC’s
exclusion of sales data outside the “ordinary course of trade” in calculating
constructed value was reasonable); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)
(“[T]he constructed value of imported merchandise shall be an amount equal to the
sum of . . . the amounts incurred and realized for selling, general, and administrative
expenses, and for profits, based on any other reasonable method . . . .”).
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Circuit found that Commerce’s decision to exclude sales outside the
77
ordinary course of trade was reasonable.
78
In Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee v. United States, the Federal
Circuit criticized the CIT for failing to provide a substantive legal
review of the appellant’s motion for judgment upon the agency
79
record.
In an effort to facilitate judicial efficiency, the court
conducted its own substantive legal analysis and remanded the case to
80
the CIT with instructions to enter judgment against the appellant.
The issue in the case was whether the DOC properly selected
surrogate country data to make a determination about whether a
81
Vietnamese shrimp exporter was engaged in dumping.
This case dealt with an antidumping order on the export of certain
82
Because Vietnam is a
frozen warmwater shrimp from Vietnam.
nonmarket economy, the DOC selected Bangladesh as an
83
appropriate surrogate market country. The data that the agency
chose came from a survey conducted by the Network of Aquiculture
Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA), which provided comprehensive
84
pricing data from roughly 200 Bangladeshi shrimp stakeholders. A
committee of warmwater shrimp producers and processors—
collectively, Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee—claimed that
reliance on NACA data, rather than data from Apex, one of
85
Bangladesh’s largest shrimp processors, was improper.
The Federal Circuit cited numerous cases to reiterate the CIT’s
86
obligation to address the issues within its jurisdiction and expertise.
77. Thai I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., 616 F.3d at 1307.
78. 618 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
79. See id. at 1320–21 (reprimanding the CIT for dismissing the action without
reaching the merits and reminding the court that it, “just like any other federal
court, must address the issues within its jurisdiction”). Further, the Federal Circuit
stated that “the [CIT] has expertise in addressing antidumping issues and deals on a
daily basis with the practical aspects of trade practice . . . [and] must therefore use its
expertise to resolve the parties’ disputes regardless of any complications or
time-consuming processes.” Id. at 1321 (internal citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 1322–23.
81. Id. at 1320 (highlighting the appellant’s challenge to the DOC’s use of
Bangladesh as a surrogate country to determine the value of appellant’s imported
shrimp from Vietnam).
82. Id.; see Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, 70 Fed. Reg. 5152, 5153 ( Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (describing the
DOC’s determination that certain imported frozen and canned warmwater shrimp
were likely being sold domestically for less than fair market value).
83. Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm., 618 F.3d at 1320.
84. Id. at 1320, 1322.
85. Id. at 1320.
86. See id. at 1321 (“‘Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we
cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and
conscientiously to perform our duty.’” (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821))). The Federal Circuit underscored this obligation by

1130

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1121

Because “[e]ach administrative review covers a different period of
time and different product entries,” the Federal Circuit found no
basis for the CIT’s decision to deny Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action
87
Committee’s motion based solely upon the agency record.
Rather than remanding to the CIT for further proceedings, the
Federal Circuit chose to perform its own analysis of the issue raised in
88
the Committee’s motion. The court concluded that the DOC has
wide discretion in the selection of surrogate data and that the DOC’s
policy of relying on country-wide data, as opposed to individual
89
exporter data, was reasonable.
The court then remanded the
decision to the CIT only to enter judgment against Ad Hoc Shrimp
90
Trade Action Committee.
91
In Target Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit addressed two
key issues. First, whether the DOC could interpret the commercial
availability test to include goods, which, while not resulting from
technological advancements, did not appear on the market until after
92
an antidumping order had been issued. And second, whether the
scope of an antidumping order should be interpreted literally or
93
liberally.
The first issue refers to the anticircumvention statute of the Tariff
Act, which governs goods that are developed after the issuance of an
94
antidumping order. This statute allows the DOC to include goods
95
in the antidumping order if they are “like products.” The original
stating “[f]ederal courts do not have the authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction
conferred by the statute.” Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1321–22.
89. Id. at 1322.
90. Id. at 1323.
91. 609 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
92. Id. at 1358.
93. Id. at 1362.
94. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(d) (2006) (relating whether merchandise developed
after an investigation falls under the larger anticircumvention of antidumping and
countervailing duty orders statute).
95. Id. § 1677j(d)(1). To determine whether a later-developed product satisfies
this test, the statute sets forth five criteria for analysis:
(A) the later-developed merchandise has the same general physical
characteristics as the merchandise with respect to which the order was
originally issued . . . ,
(B) the expectations of the ultimate purchasers of the later-developed
merchandise are the same as for the earlier product,
(C) the ultimate use of the earlier product and the later-developed
merchandise are the same,
(D) the later-developed merchandise is sold through the same channels of
trade as the earlier product, and
(E) the later-developed merchandise is advertised and displayed in a manner
similar to the earlier product.
Id.

2011]

2010 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS

1131

antidumping order in this case referred only to petroleum wax
96
candles from China. The mixed wax candles at issue in this case,
though not included in the original antidumping order, but were
97
later added by the DOC following a second sunset review.
According to the appellant, Nantucket Distributing Co., mixed-wax
candles, which existed at the time of the original antidumping order,
98
could not be included as later-developed products.
The DOC
concluded that mixed-wax candles, although they may have existed in
some form, were not commercially available until at least 1999, long
99
after the original order was issued. The DOC also stated that “a
‘product’s actual presence in the market at the time of the
[antidumping] investigation is a necessary predicate of its inclusion
100
or exclusion from the scope of an antidumping order.’” Applying
the commercial availability test, the DOC concluded that mixed-wax
candles were later-developed products for purposes of the
101
antidumping order.
The Federal Circuit rejected Nantucket’s challenge to the DOC’s
interpretation of the statute and upheld the DOC’s application of the
102
commercial availability test. Because the Federal Circuit found the
anticircumvention statute is ambiguous, the court deferred to what it
103
deemed to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
The
commercial availability test applied by DOC in this case was found to
104
be a reasonable application of the anticircumvention statute.

96. Target Corp., 609 F.3d at 1356; see also Antidumping Duty Order: Petroleum
Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,686, 30,686
(Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 28, 1986) (explaining that “[t]he products covered by this
investigation are certain scented or unscented petroleum wax candles made from
petroleum wax”).
97. See Target Corp., 609 F.3d at 135657; see also Later-Developed Merchandise
Anticircumvention Inquiry of the Antidumping Duty Order on Petroleum Wax
Candles from the People’s Republic of China, 71 Fed. Reg. 59,075, 59,077–78 (Dep’t
of Commerce Oct. 6, 2006) (final determination) (clarifying that mixed-wax candles
containing any amount of petroleum wax are included within the order).
98. Target Corp., 609 F.3d at 1358.
99. Id. at 1357–58.
100. Id. at 1359 (quoting Target Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2008)).
101. Id. at 1356–57.
102. Id. at 1359–60, 1363.
103. Id. at 1359–60. The Federal Circuit referenced DuPont Teijin Films USA, LP v.
United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005), as announcing “that where
Congressional intent is not clear, [the DOC’s] interpretation must be upheld so long
as it is reasonable, even if it is not the only or even preferred reasonable
interpretation.” Target Corp., 609 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
104. See id. at 1359 (adopting the CIT’s finding that the DOC’s interpretation of
the anticircumvention statute was reasonable, in part, because it accomplished the
objective of the statute to prevent comparable products from circumventing the
antidumping order).
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The second issue in this case concerned the DOC’s determination
that mixed-wax candles are “like products” with petroleum wax
105
During the injury investigation, the ITC considered
candles.
candles consisting of over 50% petroleum wax to be domestic like
106
products.”
During a series of scope determinations, the DOC
acknowledged that the ITC’s definition specifically excluded candles
107
However, during the
containing less than 50% petroleum wax.
ITC’s second sunset review in 2005, at the urging of the National
Candle Association, the ITC redefined its domestic like product “‘to
include all blended candles’” containing any amount of petroleum
108
109
wax. No party objected to this finding.
In this case, Nantucket objected to the DOC’s determination that
mixed-wax candles were like products with petroleum wax candles
because the order was not ambiguous and did not specify mixed-wax
110
candles. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument as inconsistent
with its prior precedent, which allows changes to orders based upon
111
the minor alterations provision of the Tariff Act.
The Federal
Circuit upheld the findings of the DOC because they were supported
112
by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.
113
Another antidumping case, KYD, Inc. v. United States affirmed a
CIT decision that negative inferences can be made against an
114
The case
uncooperative exporter in a dumping investigation.
centered around a 2004 antidumping duty on polyethylene retail
115
carrier bags from Thailand. The respondent in this case was levied
116
an antidumping duty of 122.88%.

105. Id. at 1362.
106. Id. at 1356 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Petroleum Wax Candles from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-282,
USITC Pub. 3790, at 9 (July 2005) (second review)).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1362 (“Nantucket appears to contend that Commerce may not find
merchandise within the scope of an antidumping order based upon circumvention
unless the scope of an antidumping order is ambiguous.”).
111. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(c) (2006) (codifying the minor alterations
provision). The minor alterations provision states that:
The class or kind of merchandise subject to—(A) an investigation under this
subtitle, (B) an antidumping duty order . . . (C) a finding issued under the
Antidumping Act . . . or (D) a countervailing duty order . . . shall include
articles altered in form or appearance in minor respects . . . whether or not
included in the same tariff classification.
Id. § 1677j(c)(1).
112. Target Corp., 609 F.3d at 1363.
113. 607 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
114. Id. at 761.
115. See Antidumping Duty Order: Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from
Thailand, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,204 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 9, 2004).
116. KYD, Inc., 607 F.3d at 761.
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The petitioners, representatives of the U.S. polyethylene carrier
bag industry, submitted data on the largest Thai producer of the
subject bags and suggested that the appropriate dumping margin
117
When conducting its
should be between 24.84% and 122.88%.
dumping investigations, the DOC solicits input from any interested
118
party to the case. In the absence of reliable information, the DOC
is permitted to rely upon the data submitted by the petitioner and
119
facts otherwise available.
A questionnaire was sent to the interested parties in Thailand
120
King Pac, representing four affiliated Thai
soliciting sales data.
producers, responded with “incomplete, internally inconsistent,
121
misleading, and inaccurate” information.
Accordingly, the DOC
relied upon the initial petition to make a negative inference that the
122
122.88% rate was reasonable and should be applied to King Pac.
This determination is known as an Adverse Facts Available (AFA)
123
margin and is permitted by statute.
In 2008, the CIT affirmed the DOC’s use of the AFA margin in
response to King Pac’s failure to provide adequate information in
124
response to the investigation.
During the investigation for the
second administrative review in 2007, King Pac failed to respond to
125
the DOC’s questionnaire. Accordingly, the margin of 122.88% was
126
maintained against King Pac exports.
KYD entered an appearance in 2007 as the importer of record for
127
King Pac exports. It challenged the DOC’s inclusion of King Pac as
a mandatory respondent to the dumping investigation and argued

117. Id. at 762.
118. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a (2006) (describing that an antidumping duty
investigation can be initiated by the administering authority itself or upon petition by
an interested party).
119. See id. § 1677e(a) (outlining that an administering authority may rely on
secondary information).
120. KYD, Inc., 607 F.3d at 762.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 763. The Federal Circuit explained that:
Because [the DOC] determined that King Pac had significantly impeded the
administrative review by not providing accurate and necessary information . .
. [the DOC] found it appropriate to calculate a dumping margin for King
Pac based on facts otherwise available and to use an adverse inference in
selecting from among the facts otherwise available.
Id.
123. See § 1677e(b) (describing the availability of adverse inferences when an
interested party fails to cooperate with the administering authority’s investigation).
124. Universal Polybag Co. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1301 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2008).
125. KYD, Inc., 607 F.3d at 763.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 764.
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128

The DOC upheld the rate,
that the applied margin was punitive.
reasoning that no new information had surfaced to discredit the
129
130
viability of the initial rate.
On appeal, the CIT affirmed.
On
appeal to the Federal Circuit, KYD argued that the DOC failed to take
steps to corroborate the information submitted in the original
131
petition, as required by statute when applying an AFA margin.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the DOC’s inquiry into the rate
must be supported by independent information; however, that
132
information need not necessarily be independent of the petition.
In other words, the fact that the petition filed with Commerce
initially referenced the same source that Commerce ultimately relied
on to make its independent determination did not negate the
133
corroborating value of that source under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c).
The decision of Commerce to append a rate of 122.88% to King
Pac was found to be reasonable given the failure of the respondent
134
“‘to provide [the DOC] with the most recent pricing data.’”
The
135
Federal Circuit thus affirmed the decision of the CIT.
136
In Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, the Federal Circuit invalidated a
regulation promulgated by Commerce to determine the normal value
137
of dumped merchandise. The case, which began in 2005 upon the
issuance of an antidumping duty order, dealt with wooden bedroom
138
Dorbest objected to the
furniture imported from China.
methodology employed by the DOC to reach that duty rate and
139
claimed that it violated the antidumping statute.
Assessing normal value under this statute is usually accomplished
by comparing the export price of a product to its sales price in the
140
home market.
However, when the home market is a nonmarket
economy, normal value is determined “‘on the basis of the value of

128. Id. at 764–65.
129. Id. at 764.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 765; see also 19 U.S.C. §1677e(c) (2006) (requiring an administering
authority to corroborate secondary information it relies on with “information from
independent sources that are reasonably at their disposal”).
132. KYD, Inc., 607 F.3d at 765.
133. Id. (clarifying that “the relevant inquiry focuses on the nature of the
information, not on whether the source of the information was referenced in or
included with the petition”).
134. Id. at 766–67 (quoting Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States,
298 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
135. Id. at 768.
136. 604 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
137. Id. at 1377.
138. Id. at 1366.
139. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006) (addressing the imposition of antidumping
duties).
140. Dorbest Ltd., 604 F.3d at 1367.
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the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise.’”
The factor of production at issue in this case was labor, which
142
Commerce values differently from other factors. Commerce values
labor by conducting a regression analysis—a method used to assess
changes in a dependent variable caused by an independent variable
when all other independent variables are held steady—of the
observed relationship between wages and national income in a
143
surrogate market economy.
In this case, Commerce selected India as a comparable economy to
144
China to determine the factors of production other than labor. To
determine labor wage rates, Commerce ran a regression analysis on
other market economies with gross national incomes ranging from
145
$420 to $39,470 per capita.
The analysis estimated a wage rate in
146
China 300% higher than the Indian surrogate wage rate.
The
Chinese manufacturers affected by this determination, collectively
known as Dorbest, argued that this approach violated the statutory
requirement that a comparable market economy be evaluated to
assess normal value based on all factors of production, including
147
labor wage rates. The CIT affirmed Commerce’s application of the
regression analysis, but required Commerce to conduct the analysis
again after eliminating four of the previously-selected companies
148
deemed to be too small to be comparable to Dorbest.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Dorbest argued—and the court
agreed—that Commerce’s use of “data from countries with
widely-varying national incomes . . . does not comply with the
statutory requirement to use data only from economically
149
comparable countries to the extent possible.”
Thus, the Federal
Circuit held that Commerce’s regulation violated this statutory
150
requirement.
The statute also requires Commerce to assess data from countries
151
that are “significant producers of comparable merchandise.”
However, in this case Commerce included in its analysis some

141. Id. (quoting § 1677b(c)(1)).
142. Id. at 1368.
143. Id.; Calculation of Normal Value of Merchandise from Nonmarket Economy
Countries, 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c) (2009), invalidated by Dorbest Ltd., 604 F.3d 1363.
144. Dorbest Ltd., 604 F.3d at 1367 (stating that Commerce relied on data from
seven Indian companies to determine the value of several non-production factors).
145. Id. at 1371.
146. Id. at 1369.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1370.
149. Id. at 1371.
150. Id. at 1372.
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(B) (2006).
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countries that were not significant producers of the relevant
152
merchandise.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit again found that
153
Commerce’s regulation violated this portion of the statute.
The U.S. practice of zeroing was a hotly contested issue leading up
154
to the WTO decision in 2005.
The case of ThyssenKrupp Acciai
155
challenged the U.S.
Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States
implementation of that WTO decision by the DOC under section 129
of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act when the DOC failed to
correct a clerical error in the original investigation prior to the WTO
156
decision.
Zeroing is the practice of treating foreign exports sold at prices
higher than fair market value as having no margin of difference for
157
purposes of dumping investigations. Thus, when a foreign exporter
varies its export price throughout the year—sometimes selling below
and sometimes selling above normal market value (for example,
foreign market seasonal adjustments)—its average margin is only
calculated based upon exports sold at higher than normal market
prices, often leading to a positive determination of dumping.
In this case, ThyssenKrupp argued that when Commerce
implemented the decision of the WTO by adopting a practice “‘not
158
inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body,’”
Commerce failed to account for a clerical error in the original
159
dumping calculation.
Originally, Commerce established a duty of
11.23% on the stainless steel sheet and strip in coils exported by
160
ThyssenKrupp. Following the redetermination in light of the WTO
161
decision, the new rate was 2.11%.
If the clerical error had been
corrected, the rate would have been below 2%, thus making it de
minimis and thereby resulting in the revocation of the antidumping
162
duty entirely.

152. Dorbest Ltd., 604 F.3d at 1372.
153. Id.
154. See generally Communication by the United States, United States—Laws,
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/16
(May 17, 2006) (discussing the various arguments regarding the WTO’s zeroing
decision); Panel Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005).
155. 603 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
156. Id. at 929.
157. See Jarrod M. Goldfeder, 2008 International Trade Decisions of the Federal Circuit,
58 AM. U. L. REV. 975, 1022 (2009) (detailing the Department of Commerce’s
practice of zeroing).
158. ThyssenKrupp, 603 F.3d at 931 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(2) (2006)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 930.
161. Id. at 931.
162. Id. at 931–32.
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The DOC is bound under section 129 to reopen and revise
163
decisions that are found to be inconsistent with a WTO decision.
However, the DOC concluded that this requirement did not obligate
it to reopen original findings to revise clerical errors that have no
164
relationship to the WTO decision.
The CIT agreed and affirmed
165
Commerce’s interpretation of section 129 as reasonable.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the Chevron framework to
166
assess Commerce’s decision.
The Federal Circuit found that the
language in section 129 was ambiguous and that Commerce had the
167
Once the court
authority to fill in the gaps of the statute.
determined that the statute was ambiguous, the Federal Circuit
looked to Commerce’s decision to fill in the gaps to ensure that it was
168
based upon a permissible construction of the statute.
The court highlighted language from the CIT asserting that
“section 129 ‘provides a procedural mechanism for aligning
inconsistent determinations with the provisions of the WTO
agreements,’ and that ‘allowing Commerce to expand the scope . . .
169
to unlitigated issues’ does not have clear relevance to this purpose.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that Commerce’s
170
interpretation was reasonable and affirmed the decision of the CIT.
171
In Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co. v. United States, an exporter
challenged a Commerce decision to apply an adverse facts available
172
(AFA) rate to its exports of frozen warmwater shrimp. The Federal
Circuit concluded that Commerce applied a punitive and
unreasonable rate to Gallant and accordingly vacated and remanded
173
the decision.
In 2004, Commerce initiated a dumping investigation at the
request of the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee and
subsequently established a dumping margin of 57.64% against a
174
group of Thai shrimp exporters.
Gallant was not included in that
175
At the conclusion of the investigation,
initial investigation.

163. Id. at 932.
164. ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1366 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009).
165. Id. at 1368.
166. ThyssenKrupp, 603 F.3d at 933–34.
167. Id. at 934.
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting ThyssenKrupp, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1367).
170. Id. at 934–35.
171. 602 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
172. Id. at 1321.
173. Id. at 1325.
174. Id. at 1321–22.
175. Id. at 1322.
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Commerce applied margins against Thai exporters of shrimp of
176
between 5.91% and 6.82%.
During the first administrative review of the dumping order in
2006, Commerce requested information from 145 Thai companies,
177
178
including Gallant.
Gallant did not respond.
As a result,
Commerce applied an AFA rate of 57.64% based upon the adjusted
petition rate and corroborated it by looking to specific transactions
for the three mandatory respondents in the investigation, which had
179
rates ranging from 2.58% to 10.75%.
Gallant contested the rate,
claiming it had “no rational relationship to [Gallant’s] commercial
180
181
practices.” The CIT affirmed Commerce’s decision.
Commerce maintains significant discretion in establishing
182
This “discretion is particularly great in the
antidumping margins.
183
case of uncooperative respondents.” An AFA rate is meant to be a
“‘reasonably accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate, . . . with
184
some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to non-compliance.’”
The Federal Circuit made it clear, however, that this rate cannot be
unreasonably high or unrelated to the respondent’s actual dumping
185
margin.
In this case, Commerce had access to much more reliable
information than the adjusted petition rate but failed to use that
186
information when formulating the AFA rate against Gallant.
The
Federal Circuit held the AFA rate that Commerce ultimately applied
187
was “‘punitive, aberrational, or uncorroborated.’”
The rate was
more than ten times the average dumping margin applied to the
cooperating respondents and more than five times the highest rate
188
imposed on similar products.
As the Federal Circuit explained,
“Commerce must select secondary information that has some
189
grounding in commercial reality.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1322–23.
182. Id. at 1323.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States,
216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1324 (quoting F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino, 216 F.3d at 1032).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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vacated the determination by Commerce and remanded for further
190
analysis.
191
In Nucor Corp. v. United States, the appellants were importers of
products from two out of an initial six countries that were subject to
192
an antidumping order on corrosion-resistant carbon steel products.
The remaining parties had their antidumping orders rescinded
193
during a second sunset review. The appellants claimed that the ITC
erred when it considered the likely “differing conditions of
competition” and separated the parties to assess impact on the
194
domestic industry.
Every five years, the ITC conducts a sunset review on existing
antidumping orders to determine whether the order’s revocation
“would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material
195
injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.” In this case, Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and Korea were subject to an
196
This order was renewed in 2000
antidumping order since 1993.
197
following the first sunset review. During the second sunset review,
the ITC decided to review the impact of each country’s steel exports
198
The ITC identified
individually rather than cumulatively.
differences in competition and regrouped the countries into two
groups: Australia, France, and Japan in one group and Germany and
199
200
Korea in the other. The order for Canada was revoked.
In 2007, the ITC revoked the antidumping order on the first
group—Australia, France, and Japan—after finding that it would not
201
likely cause any material injury to the domestic industry. However,
the ITC maintained the order on the second group, which appealed
202
203
to the CIT. The CIT affirmed.
Following the second group’s appeal, the Federal Circuit began its
review by looking to the statutory provision that discusses import
190. Id. at 1325.
191. 601 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
192. Id. at 1293.
193. Id. at 1295.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1293 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1294.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1294–95. The ITC examined three conditions of competition: “(1)
price or volume trends; (2) the focus on home and regional markets; and (3)
transnational ownership of facilities producing the subject merchandise.” Id. at
1294.
200. Id. at 1295.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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204

The Federal Circuit found that the statute did not
accumulation.
205
instruct the ITC on how to exercise its discretion in this practice.
Accordingly, applying Chevron deference, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the ITC’s interpretation of the statute was
206
reasonable.
“[U]nder a reasonable interpretation of the statute,
the ITC may consider the likely differing conditions of competition
to predict the domestic market for the subject merchandise in event
207
of revocation.”
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the decision of
208
the CIT.
In an earlier case also named Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee
209
v. United States,
the question was whether the multinational
corporation (MNC) provision of the antidumping statute applied
210
when the non-exporting country was a nonmarket economy. Thai
I-Mei foods, the company located in the non-exporting country in
this case, challenged the conclusion by Commerce that the MNC
211
provision did not apply to nonmarket economies.
The MNC provision is meant to protect against MNCs that use
affiliates in other countries to sell their products at higher prices on
the export market than on their home market, making it appear as if
the companies are not dumping the goods on the importing
212
country.
The provision “generally provides that if a respondent is
affiliated with a company in another country and if that respondent
has no viable home market for purposes of calculating normal value,
then the [DOC] uses the affiliate’s normal value as the normal value
for the respondent if the affiliate’s normal value is higher than the
213
respondent’s normal value.”
The Antidumping Act of 1921 treats
this practice as price discrimination because the domestic sales in the
affiliate country are subsidizing the low-cost exports in the
214
respondent exporting country.

204. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(7) (2006) (addressing the process for
determining whether a revocation of an order or termination of an investigation is
likely to cause material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time frame and stating
whether volume and effect of imports may be cumulatively assessed in this
determination).
205. Nucor Corp., 601 F.3d at 1295.
206. Id. at 1296.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1297.
209. 596 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
210. Id. at 1366 (considering whether the MNC provision, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(d)
(2006), applies, rather than the factors-of-production methodology found in
§ 1677b(c)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1367–68.
213. Id. at 1367 (explaining the MNC provision found in § 1677b(d)).
214. Id. at 1368.
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Thai I-Mei challenged Commerce’s interpretation of the MNC
provision, which excluded nonmarket economies from the
application of the provision because Commerce did not determine
215
The MNC
prices using a factors-of-production methodology.
provision does not refer to nonmarket economies. Accordingly,
applying Chevron deference to Commerce’s interpretation, the
Federal Circuit looked to whether Commerce’s interpretation of the
216
statute was reasonable.
The court found that, “if anything, the
language of the MNC Provision actually suggests it does not apply
when the non-exporting country is a nonmarket economy and
217
normal value is based on a factors-of-production methodology.”
218
Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the CIT.
Judge Prost dissented from the majority opinion in this case,
arguing that the statute clearly set forth when the MNC Rule applies
and that Commerce was not free to carve out an exception simply
219
because the statute was silent as to that exception.
In addition,
Judge Prost stated that Commerce failed to articulate “a coherent
220
position on the meaning of the statute.”
She explained that
Commerce did not specify when the exception would apply but
rather suggested that determinations would be made on a
221
case-by-case basis, which the dissent found unacceptable.
222
In Deseado International, Ltd. v. United States, one of the issues was
whether Commerce had discretion to refuse to consider a challenge
to the scope of an antidumping order following a failure to cooperate
223
in an anticircumvention inquiry. The CIT and the Federal Circuit
224
found that it did.

215. Id. at 1366.
216. Id. at 1368 (“Under step two of Chevron, if an agency’s statutory interpretation
promulgated under the authority delegated to it by Congress is ‘reasonable’ it is
‘binding [o]n the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” (quoting Wheatland Tube Co. v.
United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007))).
217. Id. at 1370 (explaining why Commerce’s interpretation was unreasonable,
given the text of the MNC Provision).
218. Id. at 1373.
219. Id. (Prost, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the statute “unambiguously sets
forth three conditions for determining when the MNC Rule applies and when it does
not”).
220. Id. at 1374.
221. Id. (noting that it is impossible to apply a Chevron analysis to an agency’s
statutory interpretation if it has not articulated an interpretation of that statute).
222. 600 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
223. Id. at 1378 (examining the CIT’s holding that Commerce had discretion to
refuse to reconsider whether candles from China were within the scope of an
antidumping order).
224. Id.
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The challenge that gave rise to this case was to a 1986 antidumping
225
duty order on petroleum wax candles from China.
The appellant
argued that it had not been considered in the original order and
thus, under 19 U.S.C. § 1677j, Commerce was required to determine
226
whether it was within the scope of the order.
However, in 2005,
based upon an inquiry by the domestic candle industry, Commerce
227
Deseado exported candles
initiated an anticircumvention inquiry.
to the United States at the time of this inquiry, but it did not
228
participate.
Deseado was considered to be on notice of the
inquiry’s initiation as a result of the publication in the Federal
229
Register.
During the eighth administrative review of the antidumping order,
Deseado asked Commerce to assess the scope of the order again by
determining that it did not cover candles containing less than 50%
230
petroleum wax.
Commerce refused to consider this issue during
231
The CIT held that “such a refusal is an agency action
the review.
committed to agency discretion by law, and is therefore generally
232
unreviewable [by the CIT].” The Federal Circuit agreed and found
that Deseado’s failure to participate in the anticircumvention
proceeding was a reasonable ground upon which to refuse its
233
subsequent request for review.
234
The central issue in American Signature, Inc. v. United States was
whether a preliminary injunction could be issued to prevent
Commerce from correcting its calculation errors in an
importer-specific assessment rate once the goods had been
235
liquidated.
The CIT held that American Signature, Inc. (ASI)
225. Id. (referring to the Antidumping Duty Order: Petroleum Wax Candles from
the People’s Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,686 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 28,
1986)).
226. Id.
227. Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg.
10,962 ( Dept’ of Commerce Mar. 7, 2005) (initiation).
228. Deseado, 600 F.3d at 1379.
229. Id. at 1378–79.
230. Deseado Int’l, Ltd. v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1361 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2009) (noting that during the Administrative Review, the plaintiff had two
bases for challenging the Anticircumvention Inquiry: (1) scope of the order and (2)
the date of the suspension).
231. Id. (“In response, Commerce declined to reconsider decisions made during
the Anticircumvention Inquiry, a separate and distinct administrative proceeding.”).
232. Id. at 1362.
233. Deseado, 600 F.3d at 1381 (dismissing the action requesting subsequent
review).
234. 598 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
235. Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2010) (describing American Signature’s position that Commerce should be
prevented from altering reassessment rates for the plaintiff’s unliquidated entries
and that, during trial, Commerce should be compelled to maintain the current
assessment rates).
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would not be irreparably harmed if the injunction were not issued.
237
The Federal Circuit reversed.
After issuing an antidumping order on imports of goods,
Commerce calculates ad valorem assessment rates for each importer of
238
the subject goods. These confidential rates are not released in the
Federal Register, where the overall dumping margin is published.
Customs is instructed to liquidate using the ad valorem rates assessed
239
by Commerce.
In this case, a computer programming error led Commerce to
240
establish a much lower ad valorem rate on ASI than it had intended.
On July 10, 2009, before realizing the error, Commerce instructed
241
Customs to liquidate the goods at that rate.
On August 25, 2009,
counsel to the domestic producers alerted Commerce to the
242
calculation error. The next day, Commerce instructed Customs to
suspend liquidation pending the reissuance of instructions; however,
243
most of the goods had already been liquidated. On September 17,
2009, Commerce issued new instructions to Customs to liquidate at
244
the final order rate. ASI filed for a preliminary injunction with the
245
CIT arguing that Commerce had no authority to correct the error.
The CIT granted ASI’s request for a preliminary injunction against
246
Customs.
However, the following month, the CIT vacated that
order upon a finding that ASI would not suffer irreparable harm
247
were the new instructions to go forward.
The Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s four-factor test
for assessing the suitability of a preliminary injunction set forth in
248
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. The four factors are:
236. Id. at 1378.
237. Am. Signature, Inc., 598 F.3d at 818.
238. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring the administrative authority
to determine the normal value, export price, and dumping margin for each entry of
merchandise); 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b) (2010) (guiding the Secretary on how to
calculate an assessment rate after the antidumping order has been reviewed).
239. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1) (2010).
240. Am. Signature, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1376–77 (explaining that the
calculation error in assessment rates caused a “rather significant under-collection of
antidumping duties” for ASI and other exporters).
241. Am. Signature, Inc., 598 F.3d at 821.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 822.
245. Id.
246. Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2010) (explaining that the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s denial of ASI’s
motion for a preliminary injunction).
247. Id. (explaining that “a preliminary injunction is unnecessary because the
merits have been resolved”).
248. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008); see Am. Signature, Inc., 598 F.3d at 823 (“In determining
whether a preliminary injunction should issue, we apply the four factor test set forth
by the Supreme Court [in Winter].”).
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1) that the plaintiff is likely to be successful on the merits; 2) that the
plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not
issued; 3) that the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and
249
4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that ASI was likely to
succeed on the merits of the case since Commerce failed to correct its
250
error within a reasonable period of time.
However, the court
disagreed with the CIT over the second factor—whether ASI would
251
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.
The
domestic producers argued, and the CIT concluded, that ASI had a
reasonable opportunity to protest the liquidation decisions of
252
Customs under 19 U.S.C. § 1514.
However, the Federal Circuit
characterized the decision at issue as a decision of Commerce, not
253
Customs.
Accordingly, the relief available to ASI in this case was
254
After finding the balance of equities to favor ASI and
uncertain.
noting that the public interest was best served by ensuring
governmental bodies comply with the law, the Federal Circuit
concluded that a preliminary injunction must be issued and
255
subsequently ordered the CIT to grant the preliminary injunction.
II. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE CASES
The first case of the 2010 calendar year for the Federal Circuit,
256
Outer Circle Products v. United States, involved a dispute over a tariff
257
Outer Circle Products
classification for bottle and jug wraps.
imported “soft-sided, flexible wraps constructed of a PVC closed-cell
258
thermal-insulating foam layer.”
After being imported but before
being sold, the wraps were fitted to plastic bottles that could be
259
CBP classified
removed using a zipper sewn into the outer fabric.
these items under HTSUS heading 4202.92.90, which refers to a
260
variety of carrying cases and which has a duty rate of 19.3%. Outer
Circle contended that the items should be classified under
subheading 3924.10.50, which refers to table and kitchenware and
249. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.
250. Am. Signature, Inc., 598 F.3d at 828.
251. Id. at 829.
252. Id. at 828.
253. Id. at 829 (“Here . . . the alleged agency error is on the part of Commerce,
not Customs. Therefore, section 1514(a) is inapplicable.”).
254. Id. (noting that ASI made a sufficient showing of irreparable harm because of
the uncertainty regarding the availability of relief).
255. Id. at 830.
256. 590 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
257. See id. at 1326 (discussing the proper classification of bottle and jug wraps).
258. Id. at 1324.
259. Id. at 1325.
260. Id. at 1325–26.
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261

The CIT affirmed CBP’s
which carries a duty rate of 3.4%.
262
decision.
The Federal Circuit reviews classification decisions using a two-step
process. First, the court determines the meaning of the tariff
263
provisions in question, which is a question of law.
Second, the
court determines under which heading the goods fall, which is a
264
question of fact. The court had addressed the meaning of HTSUS
265
heading 4202 in a previous case, SGI, Inc. v. United States, and
concluded that it did not apply to “containers that organize, store,
266
Thus, the question for the
protect, or carry food or beverages.”
court in Outer Circle Products was whether the items in dispute involved
267
the storage or carriage of food or beverages.
Upon review of the
nature of the items, the Federal Circuit concluded that the containers
268
were factually indistinct from the coolers at issue in SGI.
Accordingly, the court held the CIT and CBP improperly classified
269
Thus, the Federal
Outer Circles’ containers under heading 4202.
270
Circuit reversed the decision of the CIT.
271
The issue in Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States was whether
changes to the HTSUS made by the President pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
3006(a) were subject to challenge under the Administrative
272
Procedure Act (APA). The Federal Circuit concluded that neither
commission recommendations nor the President’s ultimate decision
273
to change the tariff schedule were reviewable under the APA.
The United States adopted the HTSUS in 1983 pursuant to the
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity
274
Description and Coding System.
In 1988, the President was
261. Id. (noting that the duty rate of carrying cases is significantly greater than the
duty rate for kitchenware).
262. Id. at 1325 (noting that the CIT agreed that the wraps should fall under
classification 4202 as “bottle cases”).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 122 F.3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
266. Id. at 1472 (comparing the classification under subheading 3924, household
containers, to the classification under subheading 4202, containment of any food or
beverage).
267. 590 F.3d at 1326.
268. Id. (“The containers in SGI, like the articles here, were not designed to hold
uncontained food or beverage.”).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 609 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
272. Id. at 1337–38.
273. Id. at 1338 (affirming dismissal of the appellants’ actions because the
Commission’s actions were neither final nor agency actions for purposes of the APA,
and due to the non-reviewable discretionary nature of the President’s authority
under § 3006(a)).
274. Id. at 1336 (describing the Convention, “which created a single international
system of nomenclature to classify goods for customs purposes”).
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authorized to make proclamations for changes to the HTSUS, based
275
upon recommendations of the International Trade Commission.
Following a proposal of the World Customs Organization in 2004, the
Commission recommended a change to the HTSUS with respect to
276
the classification of “festive articles.”
The appellants contended that they were adversely affected by the
277
decision to change the HTSUS. They sought judicial review under
278
the general-review provisions of the APA.
However, the CIT
concluded that the Commission’s decision was only a
recommendation and, accordingly, was not a reviewable final
279
decision.
The CIT also held that the President, who makes a
proclamation based upon the recommendation of the Commission, is
280
not an agency within the meaning of the APA. Thus, his decision
281
was not reviewable under the APA.
282
The court based its
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT.
283
analysis on the findings of Dalton v. Specter, which involved a
284
challenge to the closing of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. In that
case, the Supreme Court concluded that because the
recommendations to the President were not “final and binding,” but
merely suggestions for the President to consider, the contested
285
actions were not reviewable under the APA.
In the case at hand, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
recommendations of the Commission “do not directly affect tariffs or
286
bind importers.” Additionally, nothing in the statute required the
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1337 (explaining that, following a period for public comment, the
Commission issued its final report regarding the classification of festive articles to the
President, who adopted the recommended modifications in their entirety).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1338 (noting that the Commission fulfills only an advisory role, its
recommendations are not final agency actions, and thus are not subject to APA
review).
280. Id.
281. Id. (explaining that actions by a governmental body not considered an
“agency” within the meaning of the APA cannot be deemed “agency actions”).
282. Id.
283. 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
284. Id. at 464 (determining whether the President’s decision to close the
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, pursuant to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Act of 1990, was reviewable). The Federal Circuit addressed the facts and the
Supreme Court’s analysis from Dalton to demonstrate that, for APA purposes, nonfinal reports are not judicially reviewable. Michael Simon Design, Inc., 609 F.3d at
1339.
285. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 469 (reaffirming that a Commission’s recommendation is
not reviewable because it does not carry with it finality of “direct consequences”).
286. Michael Simon Design, Inc., 609 F.3d at 1339 (reasoning that since the
recommendations are non-final, and therefore do not have a direct effect on the
tariffs, they cannot be judicially reviewed under the APA).
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President to act in accordance with the Commission’s
287
recommendations.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined
that the Commission’s recommendation was not a final decision and
288
thus not subject to judicial review under the APA.
289
Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. v. United States addressed a
290
CBP classified these
classification of imported “oil bolts” by CBP.
bolts under subheading 7318.15.80 of the HTSUS, which refers to
291
“‘[s]crews, bolts, nuts, . . . and similar articles . . . .’”
Honda
claimed that the oil bolts should have been classified under chapter
87, which refers to “[v]ehicles . . . and [p]arts and [a]ccessories
292
[t]hereof.”
The CIT supported CBP’s decision, and the Federal
293
Circuit affirmed.
294
CBP follows a two-step approach to classification. First, CBP must
295
look to the meaning of the tariff provisions.
Second, CBP must
296
determine under which heading the goods in dispute should fall.
Within the initial determination, CBP must apply the General Rules
297
of Interpretation.
The first rule of interpretation is to classify
“‘according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or
298
chapter notes.’”
In this case, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the oil bolts could
arguably fall under the common meaning associated with either of
299
the two disputed sections of the HTSUS.
Therefore, CBP needed
300
to look to the notes associated with those tariff headings. The notes
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1340.
289. 607 F.3d 771 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
290. Id. at 772.
291. Id. (citation omitted).
292. Id. (citation omitted).
293. Id. at 776 (affirming the CIT decision that “Customs properly classified
Honda’s oil bolts under Schedule subheading 7318.15.80”).
294. Id. at 773.
295. Id. (classifying the issue of defining the tariff provisions as a question law).
296. Id. (explaining that determining which heading should be applied to the
disputed items is a question of fact).
297. See Millenium Lumber Distribution Ltd. v. United States, 558 F.3d 1326, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that “the General Rules of Interpretation . . . govern
classification of merchandise under the HTSUS”).
298. Id. at 1328–29 (citation omitted).
299. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 607 F.3d at 773. As explained by the Federal Circuit:
Here, the plain language of the competing relevant subheadings is not
dispositive. The oil bolts facially meet subheading 7318.15.80 because they
are undisputedly ‘threaded articles’ of iron or steel with a diameter of 6mm
or more. However, they also facially meet Honda’s proposed subheading
because they are ‘parts and accessories’ of vehicle power trains (subheading
807.99.6790), of vehicle ‘brakes and servo-brakes’ (subheading
8708.39.5050), and of motorcycles (subheading 871.4.19.0060).
Id.
300. See Millenium Lumber Distribution Ltd., 558 F.3d at 1329 (explaining that while
“the Explanatory Notes are not legally binding or dispositive, they may be consulted
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pursuant to the section proposed by Honda for classification assert
that parts of general use shall not be included in this section of the
301
Honda argued that its oil bolts were not for general use,
HTSUS.
but rather were specifically designed for a particular use within its
302
vehicles. However, the Federal Circuit concluded that note two to
section XVII of the HTSUS clearly excludes parts for use solely or
303
principally with articles in that chapter as parts of general use.
In affirming the CIT decision, the Federal Circuit concluded that
“an article’s specialization for vehicles does not preclude its
304
classification as a part of general use.”
The oil bolts undisputedly
had the characteristics of other screws and bolts and thus were
305
classifiable under heading 7318.15 as parts of general use.
In the only sex-based discrimination case in 2010, Totes-Isotoner
306
Corp. v. United States,
Totes-Isotoner alleged that the HTSUS
discriminated between men’s and other person’s gloves in violation
307
of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Subheading 4203.29.30 of the HTSUS taxes imported men’s gloves at
14% ad valorem while subheadings 4203.29.40 and 4203.29.50 tax
308
gloves for other persons at 12.6% ad valorem.
Totes-Isotoner
309
contended that this unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex.
310
The CIT and the Federal Circuit disagreed.
The government argued before the Federal Circuit that the CIT
lacked jurisdiction, that Totes-Isotoner lacked standing to bring this
case, and that the claim was non-justiciable because it was a political
311
question.
The jurisdiction claim was based on the fact that
Totes-Isotoner had failed to initially file a protest with CBP under 28

for guidance and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of the various
HTSUS provisions”).
301. U.S. International Trade Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States (2010) (Rev. 2), ch. 86 § XVII n.2(b) (2010), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1002c86.pdf (noting
that “parts” and “parts and accessories” do not apply to parts of general use).
302. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 607 F.3d at 775.
303. Id. at 774.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 775. Despite Honda’s contention that the oil bolts were not for general
use because they had a more specific function than mere fastening, the Federal
Circuit relied on the Explanatory Notes to Chapter 73 of the HTSUS, which clarified
that “‘bolts and screws for metal’ include ‘all types of fastening bolts and metal screws
regardless of shape and use.’” Id.
306. 594 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 92 (2010).
307. Id. at 1349.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1350.
310. Id. at 1350, 1358.
311. Id. at 1350.
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312

The standing claim was based on the argument
U.S.C. § 1581(i).
that Totes-Isotoner failed to allege an injury-in-fact that was caused by
313
the government’s conduct and was redressable by the court.
The
political question argument was based on the assertion that the
subject matter of the complaint—the use of sex in tariff
classifications—was reserved for the political branches of the
314
government.
The Federal Circuit dismissed all of the government’s arguments.
The court asserted that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i) because challenges to the constitutionality of a statute
cannot be resolved by CBP; therefore, there was no requirement that
a protest be filed before bringing a claim to the CIT under that
315
statute.
As to the standing claim, the court found that
Totes-Isotoner properly claimed that it would suffer injury-in-fact
based upon the alleged discrimination even though the vendor was
316
not the target of the discrimination.
Finally, the court dismissed
the political question argument by concluding that federal statutes
are not immune from the protections of the Constitution and review
of the provisions of the HTSUS are “within the realm of the
317
judiciary.”
The central question in this case, however, was whether Totes had
318
The Federal
sufficiently stated a claim of unlawful discrimination.
Circuit explained that
[t]o properly state a claim for unequal treatment, as with any other
claim, a plaintiff must provide “‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
319
grounds upon which it rests.’”

In this case, Totes-Isotoner alleged disparate impact based on the
320
distinct classifications of men’s and women’s gloves. However, the
court stated that a showing of disparate impact was not enough to
312. See id. (stating that jurisdiction is available under § 1581(i) only if it is not
available under another subsection of § 1581). The government reasoned that
jurisdiction was not available since Totes could have had jurisdiction under § 1581(a)
but did not because it had failed to file a protest with CBP. Id.
313. Id. at 1351.
314. Id. at 1352 (arguing that a judicial ruling in this instance would infringe on
the foreign affairs powers of the political branches).
315. Id. at 1350–51.
316. Id. at 1352 (finding that Totes suffered an injury-in-fact, despite not being the
target of the discrimination, because it was required to pay the tariff and thus was
directly injured by the discrimination).
317. Id. at 1353.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1354 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
320. Id. at 1355.
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In
prove sex discrimination in the case of tariff classifications.
addition, the Federal Circuit recalled that the Supreme Court has
held that “the power to tax is the power to discriminate in
322
taxation.” The Federal Circuit held this axiom to also be true with
323
regard to the power to establish customs duties.
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit found that “something more than disparate impact is
required to establish a purpose to discriminate for the purposes of
324
pleading an equal protection violation.”
The Federal Circuit
agreed with the CIT that Totes-Isotoner failed to allege sufficient
325
facts to support a claim of discrimination.
III. OTHER TRADE CASES
326

In Hacker v. United States, the issue was whether a disaster relief
payment to a farmer could be counted as part of the farmer’s net
farm income for purposes of calculating trade adjustment
327
assistance. The case involved grape farmers in Michigan who lost a
significant portion of their crops during the 2001 growing season due
328
to drought. In 2003, the Hackers applied to the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) for a disaster relief payment to cover their
329
losses from this event.
They were provided with $80,000 in relief
330
from the USDA in early 2004.
Later that year, low-priced imported grapes from Argentina led the
USDA to certify Michigan grape growers for trade adjustment
331
assistance. The Hackers timely filed for this relief but were denied
by the USDA on the ground that they had not suffered a loss of
332
income in the 2004 growing year. The Hackers contended that the
disaster relief payment should not be counted toward their total
333
income, but the USDA disagreed. On appeal, the CIT affirmed the
334
USDA’s decision.

321. Id. at 1356. The Federal Circuit stated that the tariff rates were the result of
international trade negotiations and that the differing rates for gloves could be the
result of a concession. Id. at 1357.
322. Id. (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451 (1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1358.
326. 613 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
327. Id. at 1382.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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Trade adjustment assistance previously required farmers to
demonstrate that they suffered a loss of “net farm income” in the year
335
for which benefits were sought. The Hackers asserted that net farm
336
The
income for 2004 should not include disaster relief payments.
337
Federal Circuit disagreed. After initially noting its broad deference
338
to the decision of the agency, the Federal Circuit concluded that
disaster relief payments were made based upon the loss of crops in an
effort to compensate for what the farm would have earned but for the
339
drought.
Therefore, according to the court, the payments
340
Additionally, for purposes of
constituted net farm income.
calculating trade adjustment assistance, the statute requires the
USDA to consider the “‘overall financial well-being’” suffered by the
341
farmer as a result of import competition. A disaster relief payment
342
to a farm could ultimately offset any overall loss in income. Thus,
the CAFC ruled that disaster relief payments do constitute net farm
343
income for purposes of trade adjustment assistance.
The central issue in Trustees in Bankruptcy of North American Rubber
344
Thread Co. v. United States was whether a party can be judicially
estopped from reversing its position in a later hearing based upon
345
changed business conditions.
Following the Supreme Court’s
346
analysis in New Hampshire v. Maine, the CIT found—and the Federal
347
Circuit agreed—that it cannot.
335. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2401e(C) (2006)). In 2009, the statute was amended
to remove the requirement that farmers demonstrate a decline in net farm income.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2401e (Supp. III 2009).
336. Hacker, 613 F.3d at 1383 (arguing that because the agency used an accrual
basis for calculating taxes, the disaster relief payment should have been considered
received in an earlier tax year).
337. Id.
338. Id. (stating that Congress expressly directed the Secretary of Agriculture to
define net farm income for purposes of trade adjustment assistance and that the
regulations are controlling because they are not arbitrary or capricious).
339. Id. at 1384.
340. Id. at 1384–85 (stating that “‘[a]gricultural entitlement payments which
result from the actual disposition of a planted crop are proceeds of that crop’”
(quoting In re Schneider, 864 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1988))).
341. Id. at 1385 (quoting Steen v. United States, 468 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
342. See id. (explaining that although the Hackers’ income from grape production
was lower in 2004 than in the preceding year, their overall income was higher due to
the disaster relief payment).
343. See id. at 1386 (holding that the USDA did not err in denying the Hackers
trade adjustment assistance).
344. 593 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
345. Id. at 1349.
346. 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
347. N. Am. Rubber Thread Co., 593 F.3d at 1349; see also New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at
749–51 (describing the doctrine of judicial estoppel and enumerating factors with
which a court can determine whether the doctrine should be applied in a particular
case).
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The case involved a challenge to a 1992 antidumping duty order
348
on extruded rubber thread from Malaysia.
In 2004, the foreign
industry—Heveafil—requested a changed circumstances review
under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1), arguing that the U.S. domestic
industry, North American Rubber Thread Co. (NART), had gone
349
bankrupt and there was no longer a need for the order.
The
trustees for NART agreed that the order should be revoked, but the
350
parties initially disagreed about the retroactive date of revocation.
NART argued that the proper date for revocation should be October
351
1, 2003, while Heveafil recommended October 1, 1995. Commerce
supported NART’s position and revoked the order effective as of
352
October 1, 2003.
In 2005, following settlement negotiations between Heveafil and
NART, both parties challenged Commerce’s revocation date and
353
proposed a new revocation date of October 1, 1995.
Commerce
354
refused to open a second set of proceedings. The parties appealed
to the CIT, which concluded that it had jurisdiction and found that
Commerce failed to explain why the agency had departed from its
normal practice of opening a changed circumstances investigation in
355
this instance.
Commerce again refused to open an investigation,
and the CIT again remanded with an order to open an
356
357
investigation. The parties appealed to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the United States argued that the CIT lacked
jurisdiction to hear the claims of NART and Heveafil because the
jurisdictional statute that the parties relied upon, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i),
bars jurisdiction when another section of § 1581 provides an
358
adequate remedy.
The Federal Circuit found that Heveafil was
barred by this statute because it could have sought the remedy it
359
desired through a changed conditions provision under § 1581(c).
However, because NART did not argue that conditions changed for
them between the original and subsequent proceeding, the CIT did
360
have jurisdiction over NART’s claim for relief. The Federal Circuit

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

N. Am. Rubber Thread Co., 593 F.3d at 1350.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350–51.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
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concluded that the CIT had jurisdiction under § 1581(i)(4) to hear
361
NART’s claim.
To determine the issue of judicial estoppel, the Federal Circuit
relied upon the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in New
Hampshire:
(1) whether the party’s later position [is] clearly inconsistent with
its earlier position; (2) whether the party has succeeded in
persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that
judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later
proceeding would create the perception that either the first or the
second court was misled; and (3) whether the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or
impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not
362
estopped.

The Federal Circuit found that NART’s positions were clearly
363
The court also determined
inconsistent, satisfying the first factor.
that the key element of the second factor is “whether the party was
successful in getting a court to adopt its earlier position, not whether
364
the party misled the courts.”
As that was the case in NART’s
successful claim before Commerce here, this factor was also
365
satisfied.
With respect to the third factor, NART argued that its
interests were now aligned with its previous adversary, Heveafil, so
366
there was no detriment to the opposing party. However, the court
found that in this case the United States was an opposing party and
367
would be affected by this ruling, thereby satisfying the third factor.
In addition, the Federal Circuit concluded that NART failed to
provide an adequate justification for its change in position and that,
368
therefore, it was judicially estopped from making such a claim.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gajarsa argued that the purpose of
the judicial estoppel doctrine was to prevent inconsistent court
decisions and that “courts should resist muzzling a party with judicial
369
estoppel.” The dissent went on to argue that the pending appeal by
Heveafil in front of the CIT, which the CIT stayed awaiting resolution
of this case, could ultimately reverse Commerce’s earlier decision and

361. Id. at 1353.
362. Id. at 1354 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
363. Id. at 1354–55.
364. Id. at 1355.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1356.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 1357.
369. Id. at 1358–59 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).

1154

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1121

dissolve the court’s basis for a finding of inconsistency under the New
370
Hampshire factors.
371
In Chrysler Corp. v. United States, Chrysler Corporation brought a
challenge to a decision by CBP to deny a refund of Harbor
372
Maintenance Taxes (HMT) paid on exports prior to July 1, 1990.
CBP concluded that Chrysler was ineligible for the refund because it
failed to provide the required supporting documentation in its
373
374
request. The CIT and Federal Circuit affirmed.
The HMT was established by Congress in 1986 and mandates that
“exporters, importers, and domestic shippers [] pay an ad valorem tax
375
on commercial cargo shipped through [U.S.] ports.”
This tax was
376
Congress granted CBP
used to maintain and develop the ports.
broad authority to implement regulations governing “the manner
and method of payment and collection of the tax and the settlement
377
or compromise of claims.”
CBP implemented a system where the
bank designated as the depository for HMT payments entered the
data from the original payment documents into an electronic system
378
for CBP and then later forwarded the original documents to CBP.
CBP also established a system for operators to obtain refunds of the
379
HMT by filing a form along with supporting documentation.
In
1998, the Supreme Court held that the HMT was unconstitutional
380
when applied to exporters. Accordingly, CBP began to reconcile its
381
paper and electronic records to begin issuing refunds to exporters.
During its reconciliation process, CBP discovered “widespread
inaccuracies” in its electronic database and had to make many
382
corrections. CBP was able to reconcile records captured after July
1, 1990 and accordingly implemented regulations waiving the
supporting documentation requirement for refund requests by
383
exporters. However, because CBP destroyed written documents for

370. Id. at 1360.
371. 592 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
372. Id. at 1331.
373. Id. at 1333–34.
374. Id. at 1332.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 4462(i) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1332.
380. Id.; see United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998)
(concluding that the HMT violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
381. Chrysler Corp., 592 F.3d at 1332.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 1333.
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entries prior to this date, the supporting documentation requirement
384
was maintained for earlier entries.
Chrysler applied for a refund on its export HMT payments made
385
between September 1987 and February 1998. CBP determined that
Chrysler should receive an undisputed refund of $13,549,018.22 for
386
export payments after July 1, 1990.
However, even though CBP
electronic records reflected a refund of an additional $782,407.45 in
pre-July 1, 1990 payments due, Chrysler did not submit supporting
documentation for that request, and thus CBP denied the additional
387
monies. Chrysler filed a protest in 2003, which CBP denied in 2007
388
389
on the same basis. The CIT upheld CBP’s decision.
On appeal, Chrysler claimed that the CBP regulation requiring
documentation for entries pre-July 1, 1990 was invalidated by the
390
decision in United States v. United States Shoe Corp. and that the
regulation continued to violate the Export Clause of the U.S.
391
The Federal Circuit explained that the U.S. Shoe
Constitution.
decision only invalidated the portion of the regulation requiring
exporters to pay the HMT and that it had no effect on the
392
documentation requirements for requesting refunds.
The court
also found “that Customs retains the authority under the HMT
statute to amend and enforce its refund regulation as applied to
393
export HMT.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
394
decision of the CIT.
The dissent contended that the logic of CBP with respect to
395
documentation requirements was flawed. In this case, CBP had an
electronic record that showed a refund due to Chrysler for pre-July 1,
1990 export payments, yet because neither Chrysler nor CBP had
paper records to confirm the accuracy of this electronic record, CBP
396
chose to withhold the refund.
The dissent argued that “[t]he
presumption of correctness of official records applies to the

384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1333–34.
389. Id. at 1334.
390. 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
391. Chrysler Corp., 592 F.3d at 1334 (arguing that it was a continued violation to
put the burden of submitting documentation on Chrysler).
392. See id. at 1335 (“And we [have] expressly recognized Customs’ continued
authority to prescribe the regulations in administering refunds . . . .”).
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1338.
395. Id. at 1339 (Newman, J., dissenting).
396. Id. at 1338–39.
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government as well as the governed” and that CBP should not,
without good cause, “invoke its own record-keeping error as the
398
ground for refusing Chrysler’s refund.”
CONCLUSION
The 2010 term of the Federal Circuit with respect to appeals from
the Court of International Trade was very active, with nineteen
precedential decisions. And while most of the cases addressed issues
surrounding U.S. and international antidumping law, including an
important decision on the U.S. Department of Commerce policy of
zeroing, the court heard a variety of trade-related matters ranging
from agricultural disaster payments to due process. The growing
importance of international trade in sustaining the U.S. economy,
and the expanding scope of trade activities in collateral subject areas
makes for fertile ground for an exciting docket in 2011.
Also of note, in 2010, the Federal Circuit began a new
transnational training and communication “international series” that
strives to identify best practices across appellate courts around the
world. This series focuses mainly on patent-related issues; however,
the lessons learned from this approach are very likely to spill over
into the international trade docket and may shape the opinions of
the judges for years to come.

397. Id. at 1339 (citing VWP of Am., Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1327, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
398. Id. at 1340.

